We will therefore consider the issues as they appertain to the main thrust of this book -Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Balkans. The important point to make here as regards one of our basic theses -neutral states should be left to be neutral -is that the decision of Greece and Yugoslavia to enter the war on the Allied side was to prove costly for both countries. Furthermore, Britain was very fortunate that she did not end up losing in the Middle East as well as in the Balkans. As the conclusion will argue, our escape from defeat in 1941 was slender, and it was probably thanks to the intervention of the United States in December of that year that we survived at all. But, whatever Churchill's tactical mistakes, it was the brilliant way in which he kept British morale alive -as Richard Overy argues convincingly in his book, 5 Why the Allies Won -which kept us going until his longed for dream of American intervention came.
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On 17 February 1941, the Turks signed a non-agression pact with Bulgaria. 6 The Turks had conceded to the Bulgarians that no other party be involved. King Boris had, in fact, been able to hoodwink Hitlersomething that caused considerable differences of opinion in Berlin. The main Bulgarian fear now was that Turkey would invade Bulgaria in order to prevent that country from falling into hostile hands -and, as it happens, the German OKH had gone so far as to form contingency plans to invade Turkey, even though such an attack would have held up Barbarossa considerably. But von Papen was given permission to leak to the Turkish government that no invasion would take place, and since the Turks wanted at all costs to avoid going to war, this proved to be the green light that enabled the Bulgaro-Turkish non-aggression declaration to be signed.
The Foreign Office, in a memorandum for Churchill, 7 recalled the next day that Britain had, back in 1940, done all possible to encourage good Turco-Bulgarian relations, something that Rendel had also enthusiastically supported. However, since then, the situation had changed, and Bulgaria had fallen increasingly under German control, helped especially by the German-induced Rumanian cession to Bulgaria of the southern Dobrudja in June 1940. (As we saw, the British had also hoped for Bulgarian reconciliation with Yugoslavia, but this had foundered on Prince Paul's hatred of King Boris.
)
The Foreign Office reminded Churchill that the original hope had been that if war came to the area, and Bulgaria were to invade Greece, the Turks would come in and defend the Greeks. But now, Turkey and Bulgaria had promised not to go to war with one another. As Rendel sadly observed, it was possible that the Turks had 'decided to try to buy off the Germans by giving them a free hand in Bulgaria'.
It is also possible that, despite an outward show of indifference, the Turks had been considerably worried by the rumours in January 1941 that the Russians would help the Bulgarians to expand their borders at Turkish expense, presumably in Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line.
9
The Soviets, Cripps learned, had indeed contemplated a Russo-Bulgarian agreement, but had withdrawn from the idea, deciding to 'do nothing', 10 mainly because they feared alienating the Germans.
Eden himself would have preferred a Turco-Yugoslav agreement to the one then being negotiated with Bulgaria (as did Cadogan), 11 and he asked the Turkish government that any agreement signed would make clear reference to the existing mutual Turco-British commitments.
